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Abstract
Students from more advantageous family backgrounds tend to perform better
than those from less advantageous backgrounds. But it is not clear that they exert
more eﬀort. We build a model of students, schools, and employers to study the
interaction of family background and eﬀort exerted by the student in the education
process. Two factors turn out to be key in determining the relationship between
eﬀort and family background: (i) the student's attitude towards risk and (ii) the de-
pendence of the student's marginal productivity of eﬀort on her family background.
We show that if the degree of risk aversion is relatively low (high) compared to the
sensitivity of the marginal productivity of eﬀort, students from more advantageous
family backgrounds exert more (less) eﬀort. Empirically, we ﬁnd that if parental
education was reduced from holding a university degree to incomplete compulsory
education, primary and secondary school students would exert around 21-23% less
eﬀort (approximately equal to a reduction of 2 hours in weekly homework). For pri-
mary school students we also ﬁnd that marginal productivities of eﬀort are higher
for those from less advantageous family backgrounds.
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1 Introduction
The inﬂuence of parental resources on the academic performance of children has re-
ceived a great deal of attention in the economics literature. For the UK, Ermisch and
Francesconi [2001] ﬁnd that students' performance in school is strongly associated with
parental educational attainments. According to a literature review by Haveman and
Wolfe [1995], the strong correlation between parental income and student's scholarly
achievements is one of the major ﬁndings in the literature on the determinants of chil-
dren's attainments. However, the fact that children of parents with high levels of schooling
or income perform better compared to those from less advantageous backgrounds does
not necessarily imply that they exert more eﬀort. As eﬀort and talent constitute the
centerpieces of a meritocratic society, the question of how eﬀort and family background
relate is in our view of great interest. The current paper advances - both on theoretical
and empirical grounds - in the understanding of the determinants of eﬀort exerted by the
student in the education process, and its relationship with family background. We build
a model of students, schools, and employers where academic qualiﬁcations - which entail
an income premium in the labor market - are noisily determined by eﬀort, the student's
family background, and her innate talent. We test our theoretical model using data for
Spanish students of diﬀerent age groups.
For given levels of ability, student eﬀort is one of the most important input factors for
education. Diﬀerent from other inputs like teacher quality, school autonomy, or class size,
student eﬀort is an individual decision variable. However, in the theoretical and empirical
literature, student eﬀort has received only limited attention. One of the few works in
the theoretical literature, is an undeservingly little noticed paper by Correa and Gru-
ver [1987] that analyzes teacher-student interactions in a game theoretical framework.
More recently De Fraja and Landeras [2006] have shown that increasing the power of
incentives and the eﬀectiveness of competition in schools may have the counterintuitive
eﬀect of lowering student eﬀort. Landeras [2009] compares a standard grading system to
a competitive grading system (tournament) in terms of the level of student eﬀort each
system is able to induce. The author demonstrates that each system's relative advantage
depends crucially on the distribution of the noise that distorts academic achievement.
The model by Lin and Lai [1996] shows that if leisure is a normal good and students are
given monetary rewards unrelated to their academic performance they will be less diligent.
Given the diﬃculty to obtain an independent measure of eﬀort, empirical studies rarely
include student eﬀort into estimations of education production functions. Among the few
papers that provide measures of eﬀort and estimate its eﬀects on schooling attainment
is a recent paper by Eren and Henderson [2011]. The authors use teachers' opinion on
whether the reference textbook provides good homework suggestions, as an independent
measure of homework time. They ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the amount of assigned math
homework on students' math test scores. Another example is Bonesrønning [2004] who
ﬁnds that for Norwegian secondary schools parental eﬀort in education decreases as class
size increases, indicating that parental eﬀort and class size are complementary inputs to
education. Cooley [2010] estimates how peers' eﬀort and achievement inﬂuence students'
scholarly performance by taking advantage of an exogenous policy change that raised peer
eﬀort and achievement but did not aﬀect individuals' achievement directly. De Fraja et
al. [2010] provide a theoretical model of eﬀort by students, parents, and schools. Empiri-
cally they ﬁnd parental eﬀort to be more decisive for students' achievement than students'
own eﬀort or schools' eﬀort. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [2008] use information on
college roommates who own computer games or video consoles as instruments for indi-
vidual study time. The authors ﬁnd that more study time can make up for lower ability,
measured by scores in college entrance exams. Another interesting paper is Metcalfe et
al [2011] who exploit an exogenous increase in the value of leisure during international
football tournaments every other year. The authors estimate the eﬀect of the resulting
reduction in eﬀort on students' academic achievement.
The current paper also highlights the role of risk aversion for students' educational choices.
When making educational choices and when deciding their level of eﬀort, students are
faced with various types of risks, related to labor market returns and opportunity costs of
education. Only few works in the literature have taken into account students' attitudes
towards risk and the eﬀects on schooling choices. Theoretical models like De Fraja [2002]
address the importance of risk aversion for educational choices, but empirical evidence
regarding students' risk aversion is still limited. In particular the magnitude of income
risk eﬀects on educational choices is highly disputed. For instance, Nielsen and Vissing-
Jorgersen [2006] use a structural model of life-time utility maximization and estimate a
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of around 5. On the other hand, empirical studies such as
Belzil and Leonardi [2007], Brodaty et al [2006], and Belzil and Hansen [2004] all suggest
lower degrees of students' relative risk aversion of around 0.5, 0.75, and 0.93 respectively.
Belzil and Hansen [2004] also ﬁnd that an increase in the degree of risk aversion increases
schooling attainments. The same holds true in our model where risk aversion plays a cen-
tral role for the student's optimal decision of eﬀort because qualiﬁcations that entail an
income premium in the labor market are noisily determined by eﬀort, the student's family
background and her innate talent. According to a variety of empirical studies in the psy-
chology literature, children and adolescents are less risk averse than adults. While some
like Paulsen at al [2011] ﬁnd risk aversion to increase with age, others like Steinberg [2007]
emphasize that diﬀerent from children or adults, adolescents display risk seeking attitudes.
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Our theoretical results show that if schools can set the optimal passing standard, two
factors turn out to be key in determining the relationship between eﬀort and family back-
ground: (i) the student's attitude towards risk and (ii) the dependence of the student's
marginal productivity of eﬀort on her family background. We show that if the degree
of risk aversion is relatively low compared to the sensitivity of the marginal productivity
of eﬀort, the relationship between eﬀort and family background is positive and students
from more advantageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort. On the other hand, when
the degree of risk aversion is relatively high, students from less advantageous family back-
grounds exert more eﬀort. Empirically, we ﬁnd support for the ﬁrst case. Considering
Spanish data for students from the Madrid region (Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas
Indispensables, CDI) we ﬁnd that if parental education was reduced from holding a uni-
versity degree to incomplete compulsory education, 12 year old primary school students
would exert around 23% less eﬀort (approximately equal to a reduction of 2 hours in
weekly homework). Our results are similar when we use data for 15 year old secondary
school students. The same reduction in parental education is associated with a decrease in
eﬀort of 21%. These empirical ﬁndings support our theoretical results that eﬀort exerted
by students diﬀers by family background. In the case of younger students we also ﬁnd
a negative relationship between family background and marginal productivity of eﬀort.
Eﬀort by students from less advantageous backgrounds seems to be more productive. Un-
resolved problems of endogeneity and reversed causality in our estimation call for caution
when interpreting these last results. Nevertheless, if our results hold, their interpretation
in the context of our theoretical model suggests that 12 year old primary school students
display a risk seeking attitude. On the other hand, when considering data for 15 year old
students, no clear relationships between eﬀort, educational outcome, or marginal produc-
tivity of eﬀort by parental background emerge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model, the
student's choice of the optimal level of eﬀort as well as the school's decision regarding
the optimal passing standard. In Section 3 we then analyze in greater detail the eﬀect of
family background on student eﬀort. Section 4 provides an empirical test of our theoretical
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of education with three groups of agents: students, schools, and
employers. Our model is an extension of Landeras [2009], taking into account interde-
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pendencies between family background and student eﬀort, as well as interdependencies
between risk aversion and student eﬀort.
Students Students diﬀer in terms of their innate talent θ, family background and house-
hold income and wealth. A student's family background is deﬁned by parental education,
social class, and social connectedness/networks (b). Higher parental education and/or
social class and connectedness are associated with higher household income and wealth
(H), where H = H(b), with Hb > 0 (in its most simple form H = b). A student decides
about the eﬀort she exerts at school e ∈ E ⊆ IR+, i.e. the time she spends studying, how
diligent she is, how hard she works, etc. Exerting eﬀort implies a utility cost measured
by the function ψ (e) , increasing and convex, ψ′ (e) > 0, ψ′′ (e) > 0. The student's utility
function U (H(b), w, e), is additively separable in these utility costs and the utility from
the sum of family resources, H(b) and her potential labor market income w.1 Formally,
U (H(b), w, e) = u (H(b) + w)− ψ (e) , (2.1)
assumed to satisfy u′ (·) > 0.
Schools Schools are homogenous. They do not charge tuition nor select their students.
Schools are thus endowed with a random selection of students. Schools issue qualiﬁcations
q ∈ Q ⊆ IR+. Formally we deﬁne a qualiﬁcation issued by a school for a student as,
q = ξ (b, θ, e) + . (2.2)
Hence, a student's qualiﬁcation is the sum of her true educational attainment ξ (·) and
a random variable ε, which is distributed according to Φ [ε] , diﬀerentiable, symmetric,
and single-peaked with Φ′ [ε] = φ [ε] , and with a positive support on the real line. Qual-
iﬁcations measure academic achievement imperfectly. A student's true attainment ξ (·)
depends on her eﬀort e, on her innate talent θ, and on her parental background b.2 We
assume ξb (·) > 0, ξθ (·) > 0, and ξe (·) > 0; a student is more productive if she has
a higher innate talent and/or comes from a higher parental educational or social back-
ground, and/or if she exerts more eﬀort. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in
all input factors, hence ξbb (·) < 0, ξθθ (·) < 0, and ξee (·) < 0. In addition we assume
1An alternative modeling choice for the individual's cost of education can be found in Nielsen and
Vissing-Jorgensen [2006] where instead of an utility cost of eﬀort forgone wages imply a trade-oﬀ between
further education and working.
2Feinstein and Symons [1999] establish parental interest  through motivation, discipline, and support
 to be one of the major determinants for children's academic achievements.
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ξeθ (·) > 0, i.e. eﬀort increases attainment more for students of higher innate talent.
Furthermore, we denote by q̂ the passing standard, i.e. the level of qualiﬁcation required
for a binary credential. Only students who receive a qualiﬁcation q greater or equal than
q̂ obtain a degree. The probability of obtaining a degree is thus given by
Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1− Φ (q̂ − ξ (b, θ, e)) . (2.3)
Employers Before entering the labor market all individuals attend school and an indi-
vidual's income in the labor market depends on her academic qualiﬁcations. Accordingly,
the labor market income or return to education in the labor market w, can be deﬁned by
the following scheme:
w =
{
x if the student obtained a degree q ≥ q̂
0 else
(2.4)
where x is the labor market premium for the academic qualiﬁcation.
2.1 The student's optimal choice of eﬀort
Given her family background, her innate talent, and the school's passing standard the
student chooses her optimal level of eﬀort e, such as to maximize her expected utility
EU = [1− Φ (·)]u (H(b) + x) + Φ (·)u (H(b))− ψ (e) . (2.5)
First and second order conditions for the maximization of Equation 2.5 with respect to
eﬀort e, are given by:
EU ′ = φ (·) ξe (·)A− ψ′ (e) = 0, (2.6)
EU ′′ =
(−φ′ (·) ξe (·)2 + φ (·) ξee (·))A− ψ′′ (e) < 0, (2.7)
where A = [u (H(b) + x)− u (H(b))] denotes the utility gain from passing.3 The ﬁrst
order condition (2.6) implicitly deﬁnes e∗ = e (q̂, x, b, θ), i.e. the student's expected eﬀort
reaction function to changes in (i) the passing standard q̂, (ii) the labor market premium x,
and (iii) her family background b, given her innate talent θ. We deﬁne Ax = u
′ (H(b) + x) ,
the derivative of the utility gain from passing with respect to the labor market premium,
x and state the following lemma.
3We assume that φ′ (·) > 0 and φ′ (·) > φ(·)ξee(·)A−ψ′′(e)
ξe(·)2A for any e, such that EU
′′ < 0 holds.
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Lemma 2.1. An increase in the labor market premium x, leads to an increase in the
student's eﬀort, e.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the labor market premium, x
yields
de
dx
=
φ (·) ξe (·)Ax
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.8)
Since −EU ′′ (·) > 0, the sign of the above derivative depends on Ax, the marginal utility
gain. Given that Ax > 0, Equation 2.8 is also positive and hence, as the labor market
premium increases, the student exerts more eﬀort. This establishes the lemma.
Lemma 2.1 captures the fact that a higher labor market premium increases the marginal
utility gain of eﬀort, making it worthwhile for the student to work harder to meet the
passing standard. Additionally, schools can also aﬀect a student's eﬀort through the level
of qualiﬁcation required to obtain a degree. Given a random selection of students, eﬀort
is the only input to academic achievement that schools can aﬀect. Therefore in order to
obtain the best possible academic results from their random selection of students, schools
set the passing standard such as to maximize students' eﬀort. The next result is an ex-
tension of Landeras [2009] and it characterizes the school's optimal decision regarding the
passing standard, q̂∗.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a choice for the school's passing standard q̂, say q̂∗, that
maximizes student eﬀort e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). This occurs when φ′ (q̂ − ξ (b, θ, e)) = 0 which
requires q̂ = ξ (·) .
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the school's passing standard
q̂, we obtain
de
dq̂
=
φ′ (·) ξe (·)A
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.9)
Given that the denominator is positive, the sign of the above derivative depends on
the sign of the derivative of the density function φ′ (·). For φ′ (·) > 0, the school's
passing standard is lower than the student's true attainment, q̂ < ξ (·). In this case, the
probability of passing, (1− Φ (·)) , is relatively high (greater than 0.5 for Φ [ε] symmetric).
The student works thus harder when the passing standard is increased, de
dq̂
> 0. However,
for φ′ (·) < 0, the passing standard q̂ is relatively high which implies that the probability
of failure is also high. In this case an increase in q̂ reduces the optimal level of eﬀort,
de
dq̂
< 0. Finally, for φ′ (·) = 0, which implies q̂ = ξ (·), we can determine the value of q̂∗
that maximizes e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). Hence, the optimal passing standard, q̂∗ assures that the
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level of eﬀort chosen by the student e∗, is the highest given the student's endowments of
innate talent and family background and the labor market premium.4
Figure 2.1 depicts Proposition 2.2. The upper graph represents the student's eﬀort reac-
tion function e∗ (q̂, x, b, θ). The relationship between student eﬀort and passing standard
is non-monotonous. The student's optimal eﬀort level increases ﬁrst and then decreases as
the passing standard is raised. When the passing standard is low, students initially tend
to work harder. However, when the passing standard is too high, students lose motivation
because the marginal cost of eﬀort is too high compared to the expected utility gain from
the labor market premium. The student's reaction function attains a maximum, which
corresponds to the optimal passing standard chosen by schools, q̂∗. This standard is set
such as to induce the highest optimal eﬀort the student is willing to exert. It is implicitly
determined by the intersection of the marginal cost of eﬀort ψ′ (e) and the marginal ben-
eﬁt of eﬀort Aφ (·) ξe (·) ( see lower graph of Figure 2.1). This intersection thus implicitly
determines the optimal passing standard; when φ′ (·) = 0, the student's true attainment is
equal to the passing standard, ξ (·) = q̂. Hence, the optimal passing standard eliminates
any noise between a student's true attainment and the school's passing standard.
Figure 2.1 also illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in the labor market premium on student
eﬀort (see Lemma 2.1). A higher labor market premium x, leads to an upward shift of
the student's eﬀort reaction function (dotted line). This implies a new intersection of
the marginal cost ψ′ (e) , and the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort A′φ (·) ξe (·) , and hence a new
optimal passing standard. A higher labor market return increases the marginal beneﬁts
of eﬀort, but due to the adjusted passing standard the ﬁnal increase in student eﬀort goes
beyond the initial increase caused by the higher labor market premium.
A student's optimal choice of eﬀort also depends on her innate talent. The following
lemma captures this.
Lemma 2.3. When the passing standard is optimal or higher, a more able student exerts
more eﬀort, i.e. de
dθ
≥ 0 when φ′ (·) ≤ 0.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to the student's innate talent θ,
yields
de
dθ
=
(−φ′ (·) ξθ (·) ξe (·) + φ (·) ξeθ (·))A
−EU ′′ (·) . (2.10)
4The second order diﬀerential of eﬀort e, with respect to the passing standard is: d2e/dq̂2 =
[(φ′′ (·) ξe (·)A) (ψ′′ (e)− φ (·) ξee (·)A)] / [−EU ′′ (·)]2. This ratio is negative if and only if φ′′ (·) < 0.
Note that this condition is satisﬁed only if φ (·) is concave near the mode.
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Figure 2.1: The Optimal Passing Standard, q̂∗
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∗qˆ
Given that the denominator is positive the sign of the above derivative depends on the
sign of the derivative of the density function φ′ (·). Note that all other terms in the
numerator are positive. Thus, when φ′ (·) ≤ 0, Equation 2.10 is positive and hence, a
more able student exerts more eﬀort. The opposite does not necessarily hold true. When
φ′ (·) > 0, Equation 2.10 may be positive or negative. This establishes the lemma.
When the passing standard is high, (q̂ > q̂∗) by Proposition 2.2 students lose motivation
because marginal costs of eﬀort are too high compared to the expected utility gain from
the labor market premium. According to Lemma 2.3 in such cases, students endowed
with higher innate talent will exert more eﬀort in order to meet the passing standard.
Hence, innate talent inﬂuences achievement positively both directly (ξhθ (·) > 0) as well
as indirectly through additional eﬀort (ξeθ (·) > 0).
3 Student eﬀort and family background
A student's family background aﬀects her potential income through three channels: (i)
directly through household income and resources (H(b)), (ii) indirectly through the eﬀect
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of higher parental education and social background on academic achievement (i.e. more
advantageous families enable their children to learn more eﬀectively, they show more
interest in their academic achievement, are better able to monitor it) and (iii) indirectly
through more student eﬀort (parents of more advantageous backgrounds may induce their
children to study more). In this section we consider in particular the third channel:
how family background aﬀects student eﬀort, and consequently the student's academic
attainment and qualiﬁcation, and her potential income.
3.1 A benchmark case: ξ (θ, e)
We ﬁrst consider a situation where family background does not aﬀect the student's true
attainment. In this case the probability of passing the school's standard is given by
Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1− Φ (q̂ − ξ (θ, e)). We denote by Ab = [u′ (H(b) + x)− u′ (H(b))]Hb the
derivative of the utility gain from passing with respect to a student's family background
b, and we state the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If the student exhibits risk aversion, that is if u′′ (·) < 0 and thus Ab < 0,
then positive changes in her family background lead to reductions in student eﬀort. On
the other hand, if the student is risk-seeking, that is if u′′ (·) > 0 and thus Ab > 0, then
positive changes in her family background lead to more student eﬀort.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating Equation 2.6 with respect to family background, b yields
de
db
=
φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) . (3.11)
Since −EU ′′ (·) > 0, φ (·) > 0 and ξe (·) > 0, the sign of the above derivative depends on
the sign of Ab. As Ab < 0 for the case that the student exhibits risk aversion, Equation 3.11
is negative and hence, students from more advantageous family backgrounds (those with
higher b) will exert less eﬀort. For the case that students are risk-seeking and Ab > 0,
Equation 3.11 is positive. This establishes the lemma.
Given our noisy academic context, by Lemma 2.1, an increase in the reward for learning
- a higher labor market premium x - will induce an increase in eﬀort. However, if the
student is risk averse and as she becomes better-oﬀ the incentive to work harder is reduced
and she exerts less eﬀort. It is easy to see that if the student is risk neutral, (Ab = 0),
her family background b, has no eﬀect on her optimal choice of eﬀort e. The risk aversion
hypothesis is thus key for a negative relationship between eﬀort e, and family background
b, to arise. On the other hand, in case of students with a risk-seeking attitude a more
advantageous family background is associated with less eﬀort. However, if the student's
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true attainment is directly aﬀected by the student's family background these relationship
might no longer hold.
3.2 The case: ξ (b, θ, e)
When a student's true attainment is directly aﬀected by her family background, the
relationship between eﬀort and family background is altered. In this case, the probability
of passing the school's standard is given by Prob (q ≥ q̂) = 1 − Φ (q̂ − ξ (b, θ, e)). We
totally diﬀerentiate Equation 2.6 with respect to family background b, to analyze the
conditions for the student's optimal choice of eﬀort:
de
db
=
−φ′ (·) ξb (·) ξe (·)A+ φ (·) ξeb (·)A+ φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) . (3.12)
There are four eﬀects in play, a risk eﬀect Ab, a direct productivity eﬀect related to family
background ξb (·) , a direct productivity eﬀect related to eﬀort ξe (·) , and a cross pro-
ductivity eﬀect ξeb (·) . If the cross-productivity eﬀect is positive, ξeb (·) > 0, then eﬀort
increases attainment more for students from more advantageous family backgrounds. On
the other hand, if the cross-productivity eﬀect is negative, ξeb (·) < 0, students from less
advantageous family backgrounds gain more from an increase in eﬀort. Hence, the above
derivative can have either sign. In order to obtain tractable results, we deﬁne a student's
expected income y = H(b) + w and let ηb (ξe) = | ξeb(·)bξe(·) | and ηb (A) = |AbbA | be the elastici-
ties of ξe and A with respect to b. We state the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. In general, for x suﬃciently small and u′′ (·) < 0, ηb (A) converges to the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion RRA (b) = −uyy(·)
uy(·) b.
Proof. For yb = yx = 1, Lim
x→0
(
Ab
A
)
= Lim
x→0
(
uy(H(b)+x)yH(b)Hb−uy(H(b))yH(b)Hb
u(H(b)+x)−u(H(b))
)
=
= Lim
x→0
(
uyy(H(b)+x)yH(b)Hb
uy(H(b)+x)yH(b)Hb
)
= uyy(H(b))
uy(H(b))
, which proves convergence of ηb (A) to RRA (b) . In
particular, for functional forms of the utility such as u (y) = − exp−βy (which displays
constant absolute risk aversion), ηb (A) = β = RRA, irrespectively of the size of x. This
establishes the lemma.
The elasticity ηb (A) relates to the shape of the utility function and provides a measure
for the student's attitude towards risk. In particular for u′′ (·) > 0, RRA < 0. The
elasticity ηb (ξe) measures the dependence of the marginal productivity of eﬀort on family
background b. Lemma 3.2 allows us to state the next result.
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Proposition 3.3. Suppose Proposition 2.2 holds and schools can set the optimal pass-
ing standard, then the relationship between student eﬀort and parental background can be
characterized by the following four cases:
Case 1: If Ab > 0 and ξeb (·) > 0, i.e. if students are risk seeking and the cross-productivity
eﬀect is positive, then de
db
> 0.
Case 2:If Ab < 0 and ξeb (·) < 0, i.e. if students are risk averse and the cross-productivity
eﬀect is negative, then de
db
< 0.
Case 3: If Ab < 0 and ξeb (·) > 0, and if the risk aversion eﬀect is larger (smaller) than
the cross productivity eﬀect (ηb (A) T ηb (ξe)) then student eﬀort and family background
will relate negatively (positively) (de
∗
db
S 0).
Case 4: If Ab > 0 and ξeb (·) < 0, and if the risk eﬀect is larger (smaller) than the cross
productivity eﬀect (ηb (A) T ηb (ξe)) then student eﬀort and family background will relate
positively (negatively) (de
∗
db
T 0).
Proof. With Proposition 2.2 holding, i.e. φ′ (·) = 0, Equation 3.12 becomes
de∗
db
=
φ (·) ξeb (·)A+ φ (·) ξe (·)Ab
−EU ′′ (·) , (3.13)
where the denominator is positive. Hence, for the ﬁrst two cases the sign of Equation 3.13
is determined by the signs of Ab and ξeb (·). For cases 3 and 4 where Ab and ξeb (·) are of
opposite signs, the sign of Equation 3.13 is determined by the sign of (ηb (ξe)− ηb (A)) .
This establishes the proposition.
Given Proposition 3.3, when students are suﬃciently risk averse and the cross-productivity
eﬀect is positive (Case 3), and given a low elasticity of student eﬀort with respect to family
background, those from less advantageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort. In this
case, the more risk averse the student is, the more likely she will be to reduce her level of
eﬀort as she becomes better-oﬀ. This case is depicted in Graph a) of Figure 3.2.
On the other hand, if the degree of risk aversion is relatively low compared to the elasticity
of the marginal productivity of eﬀort with respect to family background, eﬀort and family
background are positively related. Students from more advantageous family backgrounds
will exert more eﬀort (see Graph c) of Figure 3.2). In this case, the less risk-averse
the student is, the more likely she will be to increase her level of eﬀort as she becomes
better-oﬀ. There also exists the possibility of a non-monotonous relationship between
family background and eﬀort. Graph b) of Figure 3.2 shows that if for low levels of family
background the degree of risk aversion is higher than the elasticity regarding the student's
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Figure 3.2: Eﬀort and Family Background, when q̂ = q̂∗ and Ab < 0 and ξeb (·) > 0.
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marginal productivity of eﬀort, eﬀort decreases in family background b. However, as the
two functions cross at b∗, the eﬀect of family background on the choice of eﬀort starts
to turn positive. As the degree of risk aversion is reduced furthermore and the elasticity
related to the marginal productivity of eﬀort increases, students from more advantageous
family backgrounds will exert more eﬀort. In case students are risk-seeking and the cross-
productivity eﬀect is negative results are reversed, see Case 4 of Proposition 3.3.
4 Empirical Test
Given our theoretical results and the lack of conclusive empirical evidence regarding the
relationship between student eﬀort and family background, we consider an empirical test
of our theoretical model.5 We ﬁrst look at the relationship between family background
and student eﬀort. In particular we want to test empirically if students from more advan-
tageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort compared to those from less advantageous
backgrounds. In our theoretical model the way student eﬀort and family background
5The only other empirical analysis that considers the relationship between student eﬀort and family
background we are aware of is De Fraja et al [2010]. Diﬀerent from our results, the authors ﬁnd that
children from diﬀerent backgrounds do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their propensity to exert eﬀort.
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relate is determined by the relationship between the student's attitude towards risk and
the elasticity of the marginal productivity of the student's eﬀort by family background.
Hence, in a second step we try to test if and how this elasticity varies with a student's
family background.
4.1 Description of the Data
For our empirical test we consider data for 12 and 15 year old students. Data come from
the Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables, (CDI) test carried out in the
Madrid region. As mentioned before, empirical evidence suggests diﬀerences in attitudes
towards risk by age. This makes the use of data for students from diﬀerent age groups
particularly interesting.
4.1.1 CDI
The CDI is a standardized test that 6th graders (12 years) and 9th graders (15 years) in
all primary and secondary schools of the Madrid region have to take each year.6 The test
has been carried out since 2004/2005 in primary schools and since 2008/2009 in secondary
schools. We use the 2009/2010 wave for both groups of students because it is the ﬁrst
one in which primary school students were asked questions about their eﬀort - homework
habits. The outcome of this standardized test does not have any academic consequences
for students. It simply provides information to the education authorities. The test for
primary school students consists of two parts, each of 45 minutes length. The ﬁrst part
tests students' reading, language, and general skills, and it also includes a dictation. The
second part of the test concerns mathematical skills. For secondary school students each
part of the test last for 1 hour and a half and tests mathematical and language skills
respectively.7 In addition to the test, each student is asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire
regarding individual aspects, family characteristics, and homework habits.
6Access to this data set is restricted which is one of the reasons that it has been used little. One
exception is Anghel and Cabrales [2010].
7For both test scores on language and mathematics, deviations from the sample mean score have been
obtained and they have been divided by the standard deviation of the sample. In order to avoid zero
scores unsuitable for a logarithmic scale, scores have been adjusted to an IQ scale, multiplying the result
by 15 and summing one hundred points. To obtain one uniﬁed test score we take the mean of both
standardized scores.
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Sample In 2009/2010, a total of 57,080 and 50,003 students were enrolled in 6th and
9th grade in the Madrid region. However, we only have test scores for 53,972 and 46,394
students respectively. Missing data from questionnaires further restricts our samples to
45,850 students in 1,222 primary schools and 41,956 students in 755 secondary schools.
Descriptive Statistics Table A-3 of the Appendix A provides the descriptive statistics
for our sample of primary school students. Regarding a student's family background, we
consider the highest' degree of education and the highest occupational category among
parents. Almost half of all students have at least one parent who holds a university de-
gree and 12% has at least one parent who has completed an apprenticeship. In the case
of 18% and 17% of students, at least one parent has ﬁnished upper or lower secondary
education, respectively. Only 5% of students are children of parents who have not com-
pleted compulsory education. Considering the maximum number of years of schooling
among mothers and fathers, parents have received approximately 13 years of schooling.8
Mothers tend to have slightly more years of schooling than fathers. In order to classify
parents' occupations, we follow the ISCO-88 classiﬁcation adopted by the International
Labor Organization [1990].9 According to this classiﬁcation, parental occupations are
grouped into: (i) high white collar (ii) low white collar (iii) high blue collar, and (iv) low
blue collar.10 Considering the highest occupational category among both parents, 57%
and 25% of students have at least one parent whose occupation is categorized as high or
low white collar, respectively. Only 14% and 4% of students are children of high or low
blue collar workers.
Students in primary school spend on average 8 hours and 47 minutes per week doing
homework, with some reporting up to 40 hours. Most receive some help with their home-
8We have transformed categorical variables on parents' education into years of schooling assuming
that individuals do not repeat courses; see Table A-1 of the Appendix A for years of schooling for each
educational category.
9According to this division, individuals with occupations as legislators, senior oﬃcial, managers, pro-
fessionals, technicians, and associate professionals are considered as belonging to the high white collar
group. Those working as clerks, service workers and market sales workers are grouped as low white collar
individuals. Occupations such as skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers and craft and related trades
workers are classiﬁed as high blue collar jobs. Individuals working as plant and machine operators and
assemblers or in elementary occupations are regarded as low blue collar workers.
10For our data these groups include the following: (i) high white collar: administrative workers, pro-
fessional or technical worker (for example: professor, scientist, doctor, engineer, lawyer, economist, psy-
chologist, artist), manages a ﬁrm, works in a Ministry, works for the regional government, or works in the
town hall, (ii) low white collar: military, secretary, works in a restaurant or hotel, policeman, ﬁre-ﬁghter,
sales-man, shop assistant, cashier, (iii) high blue collar: works on construction site, maintenance worker,
carpenter, works in a factory, (iv) low blue collar: works in somebody' else household, security guard,
cleaning service, janitor.
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work. Only 28% report to do their homework by themselves. Around 27% of all students
receive homework help from their mothers, followed by mothers and fathers, and fathers.
Only few students receive help from private teachers (5%). Regarding the extent of home-
work help, 17 % of students do not receive any help at all from their parents, while most
students (63%) receive a little help. Additional variables in our data set are students'
test scores, sex, age, country of birth, age at school entry, and disability. We also know
if students have repeated a grade, if they are special needs students, with whom they
live, and who is at home when they return from school.
Descriptive statistics for secondary school students (age 15) are displayed in Table A-4
of the Appendix A. The distribution of students according to parental education and
occupation is similar to that of primary school students. Considering homework habits,
secondary school students spend more time doing homework than primary school stu-
dents, in total almost 9 hours and 38 minutes. The large majority, 41%, does not receive
any help with their homework. Homework help from private teachers is more common
among secondary school students (9%).
Descriptive Relations: Eﬀort, Family Background and Educational Outcome
Before conducting a formal test of our model, we consider descriptive statistics of eﬀort
- weekly homework time - and educational outcome - test scores - by family background.
To this end, we combine highest educational and occupational parental background and
construct twenty groups of parental background; i.e. (i) those with parents who have
a university education and a high white collar occupation, (ii) university and low white
collar background.. etc11 Table 4.1 shows weekly hours of homework and test scores
for primary and secondary school students by these twenty groups. Students of higher
parental background, i.e. students whose parents have received more years of education
and who hold higher classiﬁed occupations tend to achieve higher test scores. However,
while among primary school students there is a strong positive correlation between hours
spend doing homework and tests scores by family background, among secondary school
students this relationship is much weaker.
11Table A-2 of the Appendix A displays the distribution of students according to these combined groups
of parental background.
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Table 4.1: Test Scores and Weekly Hours of Homework by Parental Background
Primary School Students Secondary School Students
Parental Background Test Score Homework Test Score Homework
University & High White Collar 106.03 9.26 100.82 10.71
University & Low White Collar 98.77 8.51 100.02 9.71
University & High Blue Collar 94.33 8.20 99.34 9.08
University & Low Blue Collar 94.78 7.47 99.79 8.96
Higher Secondary & High White Collar 101.96 8.97 99.89 9.86
Higher Secondary & Low White Collar 97.95 8.54 100.07 9.04
Higher Secondary & High Blue Collar 95.99 8.56 99.24 8.83
Higher Secondary& Low Blue Collar 93.86 8.39 98.74 8.70
Lower Secondary & High White Collar 99.06 8.69 99.51 8.80
Lower Secondary & Low White Collar 97.10 8.31 99.67 8.32
Lower Secondary & High Blue Collar 95.28 8.08 99.47 8.03
Lower Secondary &Low Blue Collar 95.48 7.87 99.16 8.20
Apprenticeship & High White Collar 102.81 9.27 99.75 9.65
Apprenticeship & Low White Collar 99.48 8.76 98.75 9.36
Apprenticeship & High Blue Collar 98.23 9.09 99.90 8.65
Apprenticeship & Low Blue Collar 95.35 8.87 97.54 8.63
Compulsory education not completed & High White Collar 92.02 7.21 98.14 8.07
Compulsory education not completed & Low White Collar 89.33 7.35 99.40 7.34
Compulsory education not completed & High Blue Collar 88.68 7.28 99.85 7.20
Compulsory education not completed & Low Blue Collar 85.33 6.79 99.90 7.41
Correlation Coeﬃcient 0.90 0.31
R2 0.81 0.09
4.2 Eﬀort and Family Background
In order to test empirically if students from more advantageous family backgrounds ex-
ert more eﬀort compared to those from less advantageous backgrounds, we estimate the
following regression of student eﬀort (ei,j) on family background (bi,j),
log(ei,j) = βo + β1bi,j + β2xi,j + aj, (4.14)
controlling for individual characteristics of the student, homework habits, and her house-
hold situation (xi,j) as well as for school ﬁxed eﬀects (aj), with i and j being subindexes for
the student and the school respectively. To estimate Equation 4.14 we run an OLS regres-
sion with school ﬁxed eﬀects and standard errors clustered at the school level. School ﬁxed
eﬀects allow us to control for a possible bias that might arise from the sorting of students
according to their family background into schools. If schools with students from more
advantageous family backgrounds systematically assign more homework, these students
will report on average more weekly homework time. If we estimated an OLS regression
without school ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient of the variable for parental background would
also pick up a school's policy of assigning more homework. Hence by introducing school
ﬁxed eﬀects into the regression we can shut oﬀ any eﬀects of diﬀerent school policies and
focus on the direct eﬀects of a student's parental background on eﬀort.
As a measure of eﬀort (ei,j) we consider hours of homework per week.
12 As measures for
the student's family background (bi,j) we include the highest occupational and educational
12To deal with students who report zero hours of homework on a logarithmic scale, we follow Hu [1972]
substituting these values by 0.000001.
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category among parents. We approximate a student's innate talent (θ) by using dummy
variables for students who have repeated a grade as well as for disabled or special needs
students. As students' individual variables we include gender, age, country of birth, age
when starting school, situation at home, and help with homework.13 Tables 4.2 and 4.3
present our estimation results. Our coeﬃcient of interest is β1, measuring the eﬀect of
parental background on student eﬀort.
We ﬁnd that for both groups of students, higher parental education is clearly related to
more hours of homework, i.e. students from educationally more advantageous background
exert more eﬀort. Results in column 3 of Table 4.2 show that comparing a 12 year old
student with a parent who graduated from university to a student whose parent has not
ﬁnished any compulsory education, if the former dedicates 8.79 hours (mean value) a week
to homework, the latter studies 6.72 hours per week, 2 hours or 23.5% less. In case of
older students results displayed in column 3 of Table 4.3 are similar. The same change in
parental education is associated with 21.7% less homework, i.e. respective to the mean,
2 hours and 5 minutes less weekly homework time. For primary school students we also
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in homework time between students with a parent who grad-
uated from university and those with a parent who only has lower secondary education.14
When considering other aspects of parental background, like occupational categories, co-
eﬃcients for younger students point into the same direction. Compared to children of
high white collar employees, children of parents with low white collar occupations spend
signiﬁcantly fewer hours per week doing homework, 7.8%. However, the remaining co-
eﬃcients of parental occupational categories as well as those for older students are not
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Overall, parental educational and occupational backgrounds
seems to be somewhat more important for determining student eﬀort of primary school
students compared to secondary school students.
Coeﬃcients of variables related to individual characteristics show the expected signs.
Girls in primary and even more so in secondary school spend more time doing homework.
Receiving homework help from somebody increases time dedicated to it. Students who
have repeated a grade dedicate less time to homework.
13Our data set does not provide all information needed to estimate our theoretical student's eﬀort
best response function (e∗ = e (q̂, x, b, θ)). In particular, we lack information about the labor market
premium (x), as well as the passing standard (q̂), given that scores from neither test have any academic
consequences for students.
14While there might exist an endogeneity problem regressing homework habits on hours of homework,
we consider it of secondary nature given that it only operates through the eﬀect of homework on achieve-
ment. In addition, coeﬃcients change little when including homework habits, i.e. when moving from
column 1 to columns 2, 3 or 4.
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Table 4.2: Coeﬃcients from School Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Hours of Homework
- Primary School Students
1 2 3 4
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship 0.041 (0.031) 0.047 (0.031) 0.038 (0.031) 0.038 (0.031)
Higher secondary -0.000 (0.029) 0.008 (0.028) 0.009 (0.028) 0.009 (0.028)
Lower secondary -0.098*** (0.034) -0.072** (0.033) -0.067** (0.033) -0.069** (0.033)
Incomplete compulsory -0.443*** (0.075) -0.276*** (0.074) -0.231*** (0.074) -0.235*** (0.074)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.128*** (0.027) -0.080*** (0.027) -0.076*** (0.027) -0.078*** (0.027)
High blue collar -0.072** (0.037) -0.013 (0.037) -0.014 (0.037) -0.015 (0.037)
Low blue collar -0.188*** (0.063) -0.089 (0.062) -0.090 (0.062) -0.092 (0.062)
Individual Characteristics:
Has repeated grade -0.493*** (0.173) -0.519*** (0.172)
Age 0.146 (0.164) 0.169 (0.162) -0.299*** (0.043)
With special needs -0.564*** (0.074) -0.572*** (0.074) -0.586*** (0.074)
Disabled -0.954*** (0.130) -0.971*** (0.129) -0.975*** (0.130)
Girl 0.069*** (0.020) 0.036* (0.020) 0.037* (0.020)
Started school:
between 3 and 5 -0.025 (0.022) -0.030 (0.022) -0.030 (0.022)
age 6 -0.159* (0.096) -0.145 (0.096) -0.147 (0.096)
age 7 -0.232* (0.136) -0.231* (0.136) -0.225 (0.137)
Born in:
Latin America 0.030 (0.045) 0.026 (0.045) 0.023 (0.045)
Romania 0.250*** (0.082) 0.274*** (0.082) 0.271*** (0.082)
Morocco 0.389*** (0.143) 0.446*** (0.142) 0.445*** (0.142)
China 0.032 (0.225) 0.143 (0.226) 0.135 (0.227)
elsewhere -0.011 (0.053) -0.001 (0.054) -0.003 (0.054)
Lives with:
Mother only -0.110** (0.046) -0.115** (0.046) -0.118*** (0.046)
Mother and one sibling 0.003 (0.047) 0.013 (0.047) 0.009 (0.047)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.010 (0.075) 0.005 (0.075) -0.001 (0.075)
Mother and father only -0.021 (0.030) -0.032 (0.030) -0.031 (0.030)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.039* (0.029) -0.027 (0.029) -0.027 (0.029)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.029 (0.036) -0.014 (0.036) -0.017 (0.036)
At home when returning from school:
Father 0.074** (0.033) 0.075** (0.033) 0.076 (0.033)
Mother and father 0.062** (0.029) 0.053* (0.029) 0.053* (0.029)
Others 0.114*** (0.027) 0.121 (0.027) 0.121*** (0.027)
Nobody 0.031 (0.044) 0.065 (0.045) 0.064 (0.045)
Homework help from:
Mother 0.096*** (0.030) 0.097*** (0.030)
Father 0.052 (0.036) 0.053 (0.036)
Mother and father 0.101*** (0.032) 0.101*** (0.032)
Private teacher 0.166*** (0.048) 0.162*** (0.048)
Others 0.106** (0.044) 0.105** (0.044)
Homework help from parents:
A little 0.463*** (0.045) 0.462*** (0.046)
Quite some 0.403*** (0.053) 0.399*** (0.053)
Much 0.446*** (0.063) 0.442*** (0.063)
All 0.191 (0.157) 0.192 (0.156)
Constant 1.756*** (0.013) 0.021 (1.970) -0.689 (1.948) 4.931*** (0.522)
Observations 45,850 45,850 45,850 45,850
R-squared 0.003 0.018 0.026 0.026
Number of Schools 1,222 1,222 1,222 1,222
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reference group: Boy born in Spain
who started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (white high collar employees with university degree) and one sibling
whose mother is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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Table 4.3: Coeﬃcients from School Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Hours of Homework
- Secondary School Students
1 2 3 4
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship 0.000 (0.037) 0.023 (0.037) 0.040 (0.037) 0.036 (0.037)
Higher secondary -0.054* (0.033) 0.006 (0.032) 0.025 (0.032) 0.023 (0.032)
Lower secondary -0.190*** (0.040) -0.102** (0.040) -0.046 (0.040) -0.052 (0.040)
Incomplete compulsory -0.506*** (0.093) -0.327*** (0.095) -0.214** (0.095) -0.217** (0.095)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.141*** (0.034) -0.070** (0.034) -0.052 (0.034) -0.053 (0.034)
High blue collar -0.089** (0.042) -0.009 (0.044) 0.006 (0.044) 0.003 (0.044)
Low blue collar -0.238*** (0.071) -0.124* (0.071) -0.091 (0.071) -0.093 (0.071)
Individual Characteristics:
Has repeated grade -0.268*** (0.088) -0.294*** (0.087)
Age -0.230*** (0.063) -0.205*** (0.062) -0.383*** (0.024)
With special needs -0.080 (0.080) -0.085 (0.081) -0.084 (0.081)
Disabled 0.041 (0.041) 0.032 (0.041) 0.032 (0.041)
Girl 0.300*** (0.025) 0.267*** (0.024) 0.269*** (0.024)
Started school:
between 3 and 5 0.002 (0.023) -0.003 (0.023) -0.005 (0.023)
age 6 -0.079 (0.098) -0.064 (0.097) -0.067 (0.098)
age 7 -0.036 (0.192) -0.050 (0.190) -0.044 (0.0189)
Born in:
Latin America -0.045* (0.047) -0.012 (0.047) -0.022 (0.047)
Romania 0.126 (0.117) 0.225* (0.116) 0.206* (0.116)
Morocco 0.143 (0.194) 0.242 (0.192) 0.248 (0.193)
China -0.813*** (0.297) -0.701** (0.296) -0.714** (0.296)
elsewhere -0.073 (0.066) -0.024 (0.067) -0.032 (0.066)
Lives with:
Mother only -0.264*** (0.056) -0.231*** (0.056) 0.240*** (0.056)
Mother and one sibling -0.108* (0.057) -0.063 (0.057) -0.064 (0.057)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.101 (0.084) -0.032 (0.084) -0.039 (0.085)
Mother and father only -0.011 (0.030) -0.026 (0.031) -0.027 (0.031)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.111*** (0.031) -0.086*** (0.031) -0.088*** (0.031)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.130*** (0.043) -0.095** (0.043) -0.100** (0.043)
At home when returning from school:
Father 0.069* (0.038) 0.063* (0.038) 0.061 (0.038)
Mother and father 0.136*** (0.033) 0.113*** (0.033) 0.113*** (0.033)
Others 0.040 (0.034) 0.043 (0.034) 0.043 (0.034)
Nobody 0.079** (0.037) 0.129*** (0.037) 0.130*** (0.037)
Homework help from:
Mother 0.164*** (0.031) 0.165*** (0.031)
Father 0.127*** (0.038) 0.128*** (0.038)
Mother and father 0.176*** (0.031) 0.181*** (0.031)
Private teacher 0.258*** (0.035) 0.249*** (0.034)
Others 0.221*** (0.038) 0.220*** (0.038)
Homework help from parents:
A little 0.461*** (0.032) 0.460*** (0.032)
Quite some 0.482*** (0.040) 0.477*** (0.040)
Much 0.429*** (0.079) 0.421*** (0.079)
All -0.487 (0.306) -0.485 (0.306)
Constant 1.849*** (0.015) 5.293*** (0.944) 4.451*** (0.935) 7.119*** (0.368)
Observations 41,956 41,956 41,956 41,956
R-squared 0.004 0.0625 0.040 0.039
Number of Schools 755 755 755 755
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reference group: Boy born in Spain
who started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (white high collar employees with university degree) and one sibling
whose mother is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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If repeating a grade is a reﬂection of low innate talent this conﬁrms our theoretical result
of more able students exerting more eﬀort, see Lemma 2.3. However, note that results
on eﬀort and parental background are not driven by repeaters. The last columns of Ta-
bles 4.2 and 4.3 show our estimations without controlling for students who repeat a grade.
Coeﬃcients, especially those related to parental background are very similar.
4.2.1 Robustness Check
We check the robustness of our results using the maximum years of schooling among
parents instead of educational categories. Results are a little weaker. A reduction in
parental education from 16 (university) to 5 (incomplete compulsory education) years of
schooling is associated with a decrease of 13.2% and 11% in student eﬀort for primary and
secondary school students respectively (see Tables A-5 and A-6 of the Appendix). Again
parental occupational background matters more for eﬀort exerted by primary school stu-
dents. Some results in the literature suggest a diﬀerent inﬂuence of mothers' and fathers'
education on children's outcomes (see Behrman [1997] for a survey of this literature).
When including mothers' and fathers' education and occupation separately, results for
primary school students remain almost unchanged. In addition, no clear diﬀerences in
the eﬀect of educational attainment by mothers or fathers on student eﬀort are found.
This is in line with Behrman [1997] who points out that the conventional wisdom that
mother's education matters more for children's outcomes than father's education is not
supported by empirical studies. For secondary school students most results are similar to
our benchmark estimation but coeﬃcients loose signiﬁcance.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that students from more advantageous occupational and
educational family backgrounds exert more eﬀort compared to those from less advanta-
geous backgrounds. In our theoretical model, according to Proposition 3.3, depending
on students' risk attitude and the sign of the cross-productivity eﬀect, the result that
students from more advantageous family backgrounds exert more eﬀort (de
db
> 0) is due
to ηb(ξe) ≷ ηb(A).15 An empirical test of our theoretical result thus requires information
on students' risk attitude and/or on the elasticity of the marginal productivity of student
eﬀort by family background. Given our data set we cannot directly test for students'
attitudes towards risk. However, the marginal productivity of student eﬀort with respect
to family background can be estimated. In particular, we can test for the sign of the
cross-productivity eﬀect. In addition we also test our assumptions on a positive direct
15Note that this result is strongly determined by our assumption that costs of eﬀort are independent
of parental background.
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productivity eﬀect related to family background ξb (·) and a positive direct productivity
eﬀect related to eﬀort ξe (·) . The next section performs these tests.
4.3 Marginal Productivity of Eﬀort and Family Background
We specify the following student achievement function
log(qi,j) = βo +β1bi,j +β2ei,j +β3e
2
i,j +β4bi,jei,j +β5bi,je
2
i,j +β6xi,j +β7xi,jbi,j +aj, (4.15)
where as before (ei,j) denotes student eﬀort, which we also include squared to test for
possible decreasing returns to scale. Family background variables are denoted by (bi,j)
and (xi,j) are variables of individual characteristics and (aj) are school ﬁxed eﬀects, with i
and j being subindexes for the student and the school respectively. We include interaction
terms between parental background variables and student eﬀort in order to test our theo-
retical assumption of a possible distinct impact of student eﬀort on achievement according
to family background (β4 6= 0). We also include a term interacting family background and
eﬀort squared to test for diﬀerences in returns to scale along family backgrounds. The
term (xi,jbi,j) interacts dummy variables regarding homework help with the educational
categories of the mother and/or father who is reported to help with homework.16 Speci-
fying qi,j as the student's test score we estimate Equation 4.15 using an OLS regression
with school ﬁxed eﬀects. Again we cluster standard errors at the school level. School
ﬁxed eﬀects are of additional importance in this estimation given possible diﬀerences in
passing standards across schools. In addition, sorting of students into schools according to
family background, in combination with diﬀerences in schools' resources that might aﬀect
academic achievement of students diﬀerently (number and quality of teachers, ﬁnance etc)
could lead to a bias in an estimation without ﬁxed eﬀects.
Estimation of Equation 4.15 faces two main problems. Student ability is an omitted vari-
able in our estimation. We try to address this problem by using dummy variables to
capture students' ability, i.e. if a student has repeated a grade, if he or she has special
needs or is disabled. But in addition there is also a problem of reversed causality. The
time students spend doing homework not only determines their achievement, but it is
possibly also aﬀected by their past achievement which in turn is highly correlated with
current achievement. We thus cannot conclude anything about the causal relationship
between family background and student eﬀort on achievement. However, we argue that
16In case the student indicates that both mother and father usually help with homework we use highest
educational category among both parents. In case students report neither help by fathers nor mothers
we set the interaction term to zero, independently of information on parental education being provided.
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we are able to say something about how the relationship between eﬀort and achievement
diﬀers according to family background and for diﬀerent age groups.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show our estimation results. Our coeﬃcients of interest are β4 and
β5 related to the cross-productivity eﬀect, as well as β1, β2, and β3 that indicate direct
productivities of parental background and eﬀort respectively. In line with our theory,
for primary school students we ﬁnd a positive marginal productivity of eﬀort. One addi-
tional hour of homework time is associated with an increase in the student's test score of
0.5%; i.e. 3% of one standard deviation, ξe > 0 . We also ﬁnd empirical evidence for a
positive direct productivity eﬀect of family background on achievement, ξb > 0. Regard-
ing marginal productivities of eﬀort by family background - contrary to our expectations
- students whose parents are high or low blue collar employees have a slightly higher
productivity of eﬀort compared to those whose parents are high white collar employees,
ξeb < 0. According to Proposition 3.3 the result
de
db
> 0 in combination with ξeb < 0,
requires Ab > 0, a risk seeking attitude by 12 year old primary school students.
When we estimate Equation 4.15 using data for older students, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of homework time on test scores nor any diﬀerences in marginal productivities of
eﬀort by parental background, ξSecondarye ≈ 0 and ξSecondaryeb ≈ 0. We do ﬁnd a direct
productivity eﬀect of family background on achievement, ξSecondaryb > 0, but much smaller
than the one found for primary school students. Regarding other variables, coeﬃcients
show the expected signs. The overall explanatory power of our regressors is much higher
for test scores of younger students.
4.3.1 Robustness Check
Given that some of our results diﬀer from the initial expectations, we run some robustness
checks (see Tables A-7 to A-10 of the Appendix A ). Findings in the literature suggest
important diﬀerences in risk attitudes across gender, see Eckel and Grossman [2008] for an
overview of empirical results on this matter. Hence, we estimate our regression separately
for boys and girls. We ﬁnd a positive marginal productivity of eﬀort and diﬀerences in
marginal productivities by family background for both boys and girls for primary school
students only. We also look at native and foreign students who might have diﬀerent at-
titudes towards risk. Results for native primary school students are very much in line
with those for the full sample. The sample size for immigrants is quite small which might
explain the loss of signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients regarding diﬀerences in marginal productiv-
ities by family background. Given that the marginal productivity of eﬀort may vary with
achievement, we group students according to their test score.
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Table 4.4: Coeﬃcients from School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score-Primary
School Students
1 2 3 4
Hours of homework 0.010*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000)
Hours of homework2 -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship -0.011*** (0.002) -0.014** (0.005) -0.013*** (0.004) -0.011** (0.004)
Upper secondary -0.015*** (0.002) -0.025*** (0.005) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004)
Lower secondary -0.023*** (0.002) -0.033*** (0.005) -0.019*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.004)
Incomplete compulsory -0.086*** (0.004) -0.102*** (0.008) -0.046*** (0.006) -0.042*** (0.006)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.033*** (0.002) -0.052*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.003) -0.024*** (0.004)
High blue collar -0.044*** (0.002) -0.070*** (0.006) -0.036*** (0.004) -0.035*** (0.004)
Low blue collar -0.056*** (0.004) -0.085*** (0.008) -0.041*** (0.007) -0.039*** (0.007)
Interaction: Hours Homework*Educational category parents:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Upper secondary 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary 0.001* (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory 0.003* (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Interaction: Hours Homework*Occupational category parents:
Hwk*Low white collar 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*High blue collar 0.004*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
Hwk*Low blue collar 0.005*** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001)
Interaction: Hours Homework2**Educational category parents:
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Interaction: Hours Homework2*Occupational category parents
Hwk2*Low white collar -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar -0.000* (0.00) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother -0.018*** (0.002) -0.015*** (0.002)
Father -0.013*** (0.002) -0.006** (0.003)
Mother and father -0.007*** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002)
Private teacher -0.065*** (0.003) -0.066*** (0.003)
Others -0.016*** (0.002) -0.016*** (0.002)
Homework help from parents:
A little -0.018*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.002)
Quite some -0.047*** (0.002) -0.047*** (0.002)
Much -0.061*** (0.003) -0.060*** (0.003)
All -0.086*** (0.007) -0.086*** (0.007)
Started school
between 3 and 5 -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
age 6 -0.025*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.004)
age 7 -0.049*** (0.006) -0.050*** (0.006)
Born in:
Latin America -0.024*** (0.002) -0.023*** (0.002)
Romania 0.011** (0.004) 0.010** (0.004)
Morocco -0.020*** (0.007) -0.021*** (0.007)
in China 0.006 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009)
elsewhere -0.005** (0.003) -0.005** (0.003)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.149*** (0.004) -0.149*** (0.004)
Disabled -0.204*** (0.005) -0.204*** (0.005)
Girl -0.008*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001)
Has repeated grade -0.106*** (0.008) -0.106*** (0.008)
Age 0.031*** (0.008) 0.031*** (0.008)
At home when returning from school:
Father -0.004** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002)
Mother and father -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Others 0.003* (0.001) 0.003* (0.001)
Nobody -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only -0.032*** (0.002) -0.032*** (0.002)
Mother and one sibling -0.008*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.016*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.004)
Mother and father only -0.011*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.012*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively no no no yes
Constant 4.578*** (0.002) 4.594*** (0.003) 4.292*** (0.093) 4.294*** (0.093)
Observations 45,850 45,850 45,850 45,850
R-squared 0.094 0.097 0.373 0.374
Number of Schools 1,222 1,222 1,222 1,222
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who started school
before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar workers with university education) and one sibling whose mother is at home when he returns
and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
23
Table 4.5: Coeﬃcients from School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test
Score-Secondary School Students
1 2 3 4
Hours of homework -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hours of homework2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship -0.005* (0.002) -0.008 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) -0.008* (0.005)
Upper secondary -0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Lower secondary -0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)
Incomplete compulsory -0.002 (0.003) -0.006 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004)
High blue collar -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
Low blue collar -0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.000 (0.006)
Interaction: Hours Homework*Educational category parents:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Upper secondary -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Interaction: Hours Homework*Occupational category parents:
Hwk*Low white collar 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*High blue collar 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Low blue collar -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Interaction: Hours Homework2**Educational category parents:
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) - 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary -0.000 (0.000) -0.003 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Interaction: Hours Homework2*Occupational category parents
Hwk2*Low white collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) - 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother -0.001 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002)
Father 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)
Mother and father 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Private teacher 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Others 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Homework help from parents:
A little -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Quite some -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002)
Much -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
All 0.014 (0.009) 0.014 (0.009)
Started school
between 3 and 5 -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
age 6 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
age 7 -0.003 (0.007) -0.003 (0.007)
Born in:
Latin America 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Romania -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
Morocco 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007)
in China -0.005 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008)
elsewhere -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.187*** (0.005) -0.187*** (0.005)
Disabled -0.144*** (0.003) -0.144*** (0.003)
Girl -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Has repeated grade -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
Age 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
At home when returning from school:
Father 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Mother and father -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Others 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Nobody -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Mother and one sibling -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004)
Mother and father only -0.003* (0.002) -0.003* (0.002)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively no no no yes
Constant 4.600*** (0.002) 4.601*** (0.002) 4.615*** (0.033) 4.616*** (0.033)
Observations 41,956 41,956 41,956 41,956
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.142
Number of Schools 755 755 755 755
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who started school
before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar workers with university education) and one sibling whose mother is at home when he returns
and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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When considering students with test scores below the lowest or above the highest quar-
tile, diﬀerences in results on marginal productivity of eﬀort between younger and older
students remain for those with test scores below the lowest quartile. Coeﬃcients related
to marginal productivity of eﬀort by parental background loose insigniﬁcance. We also
consider a sample without repeaters, disabled, and special needs students. We observe
little changes in results for secondary school students, while for primary school students
we ﬁnd that having a parent with a low white collar occupation is related to a lower
marginal productivity of eﬀort compared to having a parent with a university degree.
We can only conjecture why 12 year old students from less advantageous family back-
grounds seem to somehow be better equipped to turn hours of homework (eﬀort) into
higher test scores (better achievements). Self-motivation might play a more important
role for those from less advantageous family backgrounds, and students who decide to
study by themselves may be more productive than those being encouraged by their par-
ents. We check if our results hold when we disregard those students who receive help with
their homework from parents, private teachers, or others. We thus run our regressions for
students who study by themselves and who we expect to be more self-motivated. If the
higher marginal productivity of eﬀort by students of less advantageous family background
was explained for by the diﬀerences in encouragement by parents, we would expect dif-
ferences in marginal productivities to disappear. However, this is not the case. While
marginal productivities of eﬀort for this group of students diﬀer by parental educational in-
stead of occupational background, eﬀort by students from less advantageous backgrounds
continues to be more productive. For secondary school students results for this group of
students does not diﬀer from the overall results.
Similarly selection eﬀects related to diﬀerences in innate talent might explain the higher
marginal productivity of eﬀort by students from less advantageous family backgrounds.
Children from less advantageous backgrounds who spend many hours doing homework
may be of greater innate talent (and/or self motivation) than those studying similar
amounts of time from more advantageous family backgrounds. However, given the lack of
data on measures of innate talent we cannot test for this hypothesis. An alternative expla-
nation might be related to other inputs to education like educational software, computers,
and textbooks. If these are complements to eﬀort and if there are decreasing returns to
scale in inputs to education, then hours of homework by students from less advantageous
backgrounds who dispose of less additional inputs to education will be more productive.
In the context of our theoretical model this last result together with our previous em-
pirical ﬁndings suggests that 12 year old primary school students display a risk seeking
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attitude. However, our achievement function is likely to suﬀer from endogeneity problems
and hence results have to be interpreted with caution. A diﬀerent interpretation of our
results that is outside of the scope of our theoretical model is linked to heterogeneity
in attitudes towards risk and the intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes (see for
instance Dohmen et al [2012]). If parents are risk averse, and risk aversion is linked to
higher educational attainment as found by Belzil and Hansen [2004] which in turn provides
access to a better occupation, then  with risk aversion being passed on from parents to
children  there will be an ambiguous eﬀect of more advantageous parental background
on student's risk aversion. On the one hand, the higher parental background guarantees
an income, independent of the choice of eﬀort made, making students less risk averse.
On the other hand, genetics will render students of higher parental background more risk
averse. Similarly students from less advantageous family backgrounds could be more risk
seeking which might explain why they do not spend more time doing homework despite
their higher marginal productivities of eﬀort.
5 Conclusion
In the theoretical model presented in this paper, academic attainment which entails an
income premium in the labor market is noisily determined by eﬀort and the student's fam-
ily background and her innate talent. We show that if schools can set the optimal passing
standard the relation between eﬀort and family background is positive (negative) when
the degree of risk aversion is smaller (larger) than the elasticity measuring the sensitivity
of marginal productivity of the student's eﬀort with respect to her family background.
Given that the empirical literature regarding student eﬀort and family background is
quite scarce we analyze this question empirically. We ﬁnd that if parental education was
reduced from holding a university degree to incomplete compulsory education, students
would exert around 21-23% less eﬀort (approximately equal to a reduction of 2 hours in
weekly homework time). For primary school students we also ﬁnd that marginal produc-
tivities of eﬀort are higher for those from less advantageous family backgrounds.
Our results come with a caveat. In the context of our theoretical model both empirical
ﬁndings suggest that 12 year old primary school students display a risk seeking attitude.
This suggests that eﬀort choices by primary school students do not exactly mimic the
decision making process suggested by our theoretical model, i.e fully taking into account
the labor market consequences of exerting more or less eﬀort. Given that we ﬁnd no dif-
ferences in marginal productivity by family background and zero marginal productivity
of eﬀort for older students, our empirical ﬁndings are silent on the risk attitudes of this
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group of students. Both results clearly restrict the possibility to generalize the positive
relationship between eﬀort and family background found to other groups (university stu-
dents, postgraduate students). The eﬀort decision of university or postgraduate students
might be more similar to our theoretical model and their notion of risk aversion more
closely related to that of adults. Thus, it could even be the case that for them, the risk
aversion eﬀect could dominate the cross productivity eﬀect, possibly reversing our result
regarding a positive relationship between family background and student eﬀort. Findings
by the empirical literature on higher education achievement of private school students do-
ing worse conditional on measures of prior achievement may point into this direction. For
instance according to Smith and Nylor [2001a], students who attended private secondary
school are 4 percentage points less likely to complete their degree compared to students
who attended a state school. In a diﬀerent paper the same authors, Smith and Naylor
[2001b] ﬁnd a similar result for degree achievement, namely that attendance of private
secondary schools has a negative eﬀect on degree performance for economics graduates.
On the other hand, while our data set has the shortcoming discussed here, considering
students at a younger age in compulsory education avoids problems of selection that might
occur at higher levels of schooling, with those who exert very little eﬀort dropping out of
school.17 If the majority of drop-outs come from less privileged backgrounds, the relation-
ship between family background and eﬀort could possibly change from an initial positive
relationship in primary school to a negative one at university.
Given that these doubts about the relationship between family background and student
eﬀort remain, the paper highlights the importance of future empirical research to illustrate
the degree of income risk eﬀects on educational choices, and particularly on student eﬀort
for diﬀerent age groups. As discussed before, our empirical ﬁnding are far from conclusive
and are also clearly conﬁned by the endogeneity that arises when regressing achievement
on eﬀort. Finally, one interesting aspect in terms of policy design would be to develop
mechanisms that are able to induce students to exert optimal levels of eﬀort.
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A Appendix
Table A-1: Equivalence of educational categories and years of schooling
CDI
Category Mean Years of Schooling
University 16
Apprenticeship 12.5
Higher secondary education 12
Lower secondary education 8
Compulsory education not completed 5
Table A-2: Distribution of students by parental background: Primary/Secondary School
Students
Education/Occupation High White Collar Low White Collar High Blue Collar Low Blue Collar
University 17530/16366 2989/ 1804 1084/541 307/261
Apprenticeship 3187/2723 1483/1419 685/743 157/ 201
Higher secondary education 3160/3886 3145/2780 1617/1291 432/474
Lower secondary education 2006/2039 3043/2877 2199/2280 600/726
Compulsory education not completed 225/157 723/421 946/ 710 332/257
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Table A-3: Summary Statistics: Primary School Students, 2009/2010
Variable Mean (St.D) Variable Mean (St.D)
Overall test score 100.9 (13.1) (Min 60 Max 121)
Score girls (N=22,354 ) 100.7 (12.8) (Min 60 Max 121) Highest occupation among parents:
Score boys (N=23,496 ) 101.1 (13.5) (Min 60 Max 121) High white collar 0.57 (0.50)
Girl 0.49 (0.50) Low white collar 0.25 (0.43)
Age 12.13 (0.36) (Min: 11 Max: 14) High blue collar 0.14 (0.35)
Repeating grades 0.13 (0.34) Low blue collar 0.04 (0.20)
Disabled student 0.02 (0.15) Lives with:
Student with special needs 0.05 (0.23) Mother 0.07 (0.26)
Attending: Mother and one sibling 0.04 (0.20)
Public school 0.51 (0.50) Mother and more than one sibling 0.02 (0.13)
Private school 0.10 (0.31) Mother and father 0.16 (0.36)
Charter school 0.38 (0.49) Mother, father, one sibling 0.42 (0.49)
Born in: Mother and father and more than one sibling 0.17 (0.37)
Spain 0.82 (0.38) Diﬀerent living arrangement 0.12 (0.33)
Spanish speaking Latin America 0.10 (0.29) When returning from school, awaited by:
Morocco 0.01 (0.10) Mother 0.52 (0.50)
Rumania 0.02 (0.15) Father 0.10 (0.30)
China 0.005 (0.07) Mother and father 0.17 (0.37)
elsewhere 0.04 (0.20) Others 0.15 (0.36)
Started school Nobody 0.06 (0.24)
before age 3 0.55 (0.50) Homework habits:
age 3-5 0.42 (0.49) Weekly hours of homework 8.79 (5.95)(Min 0 Max 40)
age 6 0.02 (0.14) Help from mother 0.27 (0.45)
age 7 0.01 (0.10) Help from father 0.10 (0.30)
Highest education among parents: Help from mother and father 0.23 (0.42)
University 0.48 (0.50) Help from private teacher 0.05 (0.21)
Apprenticeship 0.12 (0.33) Help from others 0.06 (0.25)
Upper secondary education 0.18 (0.39) Help from nobody 0.28 (0.45)
Lower secondary education 0.17 (0.38) No help form parents 0.17 (0.37)
Without compulsory education 0.05 (0.21) A little help form parents 0.63 (0.48)
Years of schooling 12.95 (3.45)(Min 5 Max 16) Quite some help form parents 0.15 (0.35)
Years of schooling mother 12.28 (3.69)(Min 5 Max 16) Much help form parents 0.05 (0.21)
Years of schooling father 12.19 (3.71)(Min 5 Max 16) All help from parents 0.008 (0.09)
Schools 1,222 Schools 1,222
Students 45,850 Students 45,850
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Table A-4: Summary Statistics: CDI Secondary School Students, 2009/2010
Variable Mean (St.D) Variable Mean (St.D)
Overall test score 100.1 (13.2) (Min 68 Max 131)
Score girls (N=20,869) 100.1 (13.3) (Min 68 Max 131) Highest occupation among parents:
Score boys (N=21,087) 100.1 (13.2) (Min 68 Max 131) High white collar 0.60 (0.49)
Girl 0.50 (0.50) Low white collar 0.22 (0.42)
Age 15.42 (0.68) (Min: 14 Max: 18) High blue collar 0.13 (0.34)
Repeating grades 0.32 (0.46) Low blue collar 0.05 (0.21)
Disabled student 0.02 (0.14) Lives with:
Student with special needs 0.09 (0.28) Mother 0.07 (0.26)
Attending: Mother and one sibling 0.04 (0.21)
Public school 0.49 (0.50) Mother and more than one sibling 0.02 (0.14)
Private school 0.11 (0.31) Mother and father 0.15 (0.36)
Charter school 0.40 (0.49) Mother, father, one sibling 0.43 (0.50)
Born in: Mother and father and more than one sibling 0.16 (0.37)
Spain 0.82 (0.38) Diﬀerent living arrangement 0.11 (0.32)
Spanish speaking Latin America 0.10 (0.30) When returning from school, awaited by:
Morocco 0.008 (0.09) Mother 0.47 (0.50)
Rumania 0.02 (0.13) Father 0.11 (0.31)
China 0.005 (0.07) Mother and father 0.14 (0.35)
elsewhere 0.05 (0.21) Others 0.14 (0.35)
Started school Nobody 0.14 (0.34)
before age 3 0.47 (0.50) Homework habits:
age 3-5 0.50 (0.50) Weekly hours of homework 9.64 (6.55)(Min 0 Max 40)
age 6 0.02 (0.15) Help from mother 0.17 (0.38)
age 7 0.007 (0.08) Help from father 0.08 (0.27)
Highest education among parents: Help from mother and father 0.15 (0.36)
University 0.45 (0.50) Help from private teacher 0.09 (0.29)
Apprenticeship 0.12 (0.33) Help from others 0.08 (0.28)
Upper secondary education 0.20 (0.40) Help from nobody 0.41 (0.49)
Lower secondary education 0.19 (0.39) No help form parents 0.31 (0.46)
Without compulsory education 0.04 (0.19) A little help form parents 0.54 (0.50)
Years of schooling 12.86 (3.37)(Min 5 Max 16) Quite some help form parents 0.12 (0.33)
Years of schooling mother 12.03(3.63)(Min 5 Max 16) Much help form parents 0.02 (0.14)
Years of schooling father 11.98 (3.69)(Min 5 Max 16) All help from parents 0.004 (0.06)
Schools 755 Schools 755
Students 41,956 Students 41,956
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Table A-5: School Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Hours of Homework - Primary
School Students: Robustness Check
1 2 3
Years parental schooling 0.012*** (0.004)
Years of father's schooling 0.008* (0.004)
Years of mother's schooling 0.008* (0.004)
Educational category father: Apprenticeship 0.067** (0.034)
Higher secondary 0.031 (0.034)
Lower secondary 0.019 (0.039)
Incomplete compulsory -0.178*** (0.063)
Educational category mother: Apprenticeship -0.013 (0.037)
Higher secondary -0.006 (0.033)
Lower secondary -0.063 (0.039)
Incomplete compulsory -0.115* (0.065)
Occupational category parents: Low white collar -0.068** (0.027)
High blue collar -0.013 (0.037)
Low blue collar -0.094 (0.062)
Occupational category father: Low white collar -0.044 (0.029) -0.053* (0.029)
High blue collar 0.002 (0.032) -0.003 (0.032)
Low blue collar -0.058 (0.055) -0.067 (0.055)
Occupational category mother: Low white collar -0.030 (0.027) -0.040 (0.027)
High blue collar -0.080 (0.068) -0.085 (0.068)
Low blue collar 0.027 (0.032) 0.026 (0.032)
Individual Characteristics:
Has repeated grade -0.524*** (0.171) -0.541*** (0.162) -0.531*** (0.163)
Age 0.172 (0.162) 0.188 (0.149) 0.183 (0.150)
With special needs -0.583*** (0.075) -0.563*** (0.082) -0.549*** (0.082)
Disabled -0.981*** (0.130) -0.741*** (0.133) -0.725*** (0.133)
Girl 0.035* (0.020) 0.035* (0.020) 0.036* (0.020)
Started School between 3 and 5 -0.029 (0.022) -0.012 (0.021) -0.013 (0.021)
age 6 -0.151 (0.096) -0.165 (0.105) -0.156 (0.105)
age 7 -0.240* (0.136) -0.222 (0.144) -0.206 (0.145)
Born in Latin America 0.023 (0.045) -0.010 (0.046) -0.003 (0.045)
Romania 0.283*** (0.082) 0.196** (0.083) 0.178** (0.082)
Morocco 0.403*** (0.139) 0.448*** (0.172) 0.494*** (0.171)
China 0.132 (0.226) 0.226 (0.232) 0.245 (0.231)
elsewhere -0.002 (0.054) -0.016 (0.057) -0.013 (0.057)
Lives with: Mother only -0.116** (0.046) -0.080* (0.048) -0.080* (0.048)
Mother and one sibling 0.013 (0.047) 0.025 (0.046) 0.024 (0.046)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.001 (0.075) -0.070 (0.087) -0.063 (0.087)
Mother and father only -0.032 (0.030) -0.011 (0.029) -0.010 (0.029)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.033 (0.029) -0.027 (0.029) -0.020 (0.029)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.014 (0.036) -0.011 (0.037) -0.010 (0.037)
At home when returning from school: Father 0.075** (0.033) 0.060* (0.035) 0.060* (0.035)
Mother and father 0.051* (0.029) 0.033 (0.029) 0.034 (0.029)
Others 0.120*** (0.027) 0.091*** (0.028) 0.094*** (0.028)
Nobody 0.063 (0.045) 0.045 (0.045) 0.048 (0.045)
Homework Help from: Mother 0.097*** (0.030) 0.072** (0.032) 0.071** (0.032)
Father 0.054 (0.036) 0.054 (0.037) 0.053 (0.037
Mother and father 0.102*** (0.032) 0.087*** (0.033) 0.086** (0.033)
Private teacher 0.167*** (0.048) 0.135*** (0.051) 0.135*** (0.051)
Others 0.104** (0.044) 0.123*** (0.046) 0.125*** (0.046)
Homework help from parents: A little 0.466*** (0.046) 0.412*** (0.046) 0.408*** (0.046)
Quite some 0.407*** (0.053) 0.374*** (0.054) 0.369*** (0.054)
Much 0.449*** (0.064) 0.385*** (0.065) 0.380*** (0.065)
All 0.196 (0.156) 0.200 (0.160) 0.199 (0.160)
Constant -0.895 (1.945) -1.054 (1.790) -0.772 (1.795)
Observations 45,850 39,475 39,475
R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.022
Number of Schools 1,222 1,221 1,221
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reference group: Boy
born in Spain who started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (white high collar employees with university
education) and one sibling whose mother is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework
help from anybody.
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Table A-6: School Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Hours of Homework - Secondary
School Students: Robustness Check
1 2 3
Years parental schooling 0.010** (0.005)
Years of father's schooling 0.008* (0.005)
Years of mother's schooling 0.006 (0.005)
Educational category father: Apprenticeship 0.024 (0.041)
Higher secondary 0.055 (0.034)
Lower secondary -0.037 (0.043)
Incomplete compulsory -0.118 (0.073)
Educational category mother: Apprenticeship -0.006 (0.041)
Higher secondary -0.037 (0.037)
Lower secondary -0.037 (0.043)
Incomplete compulsory -0.090 (0.077)
Occupational category parents: Low white collar -0.041 (0.034)
High blue collar 0.005 (0.044)
Low blue collar -0.092 (0.071)
Occupational category father: Low white collar -0.020 (0.034) -0.030 (0.034)
High blue collar -0.030 (0.038) -0.033 (0.039)
Low blue collar -0.075 (0.063) -0.080 (0.063)
Occupational category mother: Low white collar 0.003 (0.033) -0.002 (0.033)
High blue collar 0.141* (0.077) 0.137* (0.077)
Low blue collar 0.038 (0.039) 0.036 (0.039)
Individual Characteristics:
Has repeated grade -0.291*** (0.087) -0.314*** (0.094) -0.314*** (0.094)
Age -0.206*** (0.063) -0.181*** (0.069) -0.181*** (0.069)
With special needs -0.084 (0.081) -0.122 (0.092) -0.121 (0.092)
Disabled 0.032 (0.041) 0.028 (0.042) 0.029 (0.042)
Girl 0.266*** (0.024) 0.254*** (0.025) 0.255*** (0.025)
Started School between 3 and 5 -0.001 (0.023) 0.008 (0.024) 0.007 (0.024)
age 6 -0.068 (0.097) 0.016 (0.109) 0.016 (0.110)
age 7 -0.060 (0.190) 0.138 (0.198) 0.147 (0.198)
Born in Latin America -0.016 (0.047) -0.061 (0.051) -0.057 (0.051)
Romania 0.243** (0.116) 0.275** (0.118) 0.254** (0.118)
Morocco 0.179 (0.189) 0.068 (0.292) 0.104 (0.294)
China -0.712** (0.296) -0.860** (0.335) -0.854** (0.336)
elsewhere -0.027 (0.067) -0.057 (0.077) -0.055 (0.076)
Lives with: Mother only -0.234*** (0.056) -0.232*** (0.059) -0.232*** (0.059)
Mother and one sibling -0.066 (0.057) -0.081 (0.059) -0.081 (0.059)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.038 (0.084) -0.115 (0.098) -0.113 (0.098)
Mother and father only -0.026 (0.031) -0.030 (0.032) -0.030 (0.032)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.091*** (0.031) -0115*** (0.033) -0.111*** (0.033)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.097** (0.043) -0.118** (0.048) -0.117** (0.048)
At home when returning from school: Father 0.062* (0.038) 0.070* (0.040) 0.070* (0.040)
Mother and father 0.112*** (0.033) 0.124*** (0.033) 0.124*** (0.033)
Others 0.041 (0.034) 0.041 (0.036) 0.043 (0.036)
Nobody 0.127*** (0.037) 0.105*** (0.038) 0.107*** (0.038)
Homework Help from: Mother 0.165*** (0.031) 0.152*** (0.032) 0.152*** (0.032)
Father 0.127*** (0.038) 0.079* (0.042) 0.080* (0.042)
Mother and father 0.176*** (0.031) 0.168*** (0.033) 0.168*** (0.033)
Private teacher 0.261*** (0.035) 0.252*** (0.037) 0.249*** (0.037)
Others 0.222*** (0.038) 0.222*** (0.038) 0.222*** (0.038)
Homework help from parents: A little 0.463*** (0.032) 0.453*** (0.035) 0.451*** (0.035)
Quite some 0.484*** (0.040) 0.474*** (0.043) 0.471*** (0.043)
Much 0.432*** (0.079) 0.455*** (0.082) 0.453*** (0.082)
All -0.485 (0.306) -0.102 (0.273) -0.102 (0.273)
Constant 4.337*** (0.932) 3.938*** (1.035) 4.150*** (1.035)
Observations 41,956 35,997 35,997
R-squared 0.039 0.040 0.040
Number of Schools 755 754 754
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reference group: Boy
born in Spain who started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (white high collar employees with university
education) and one sibling whose mother is at home when he returns from school and who does not receive any homework
help from anybody.
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Table A-7: School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score-Primary School Students:
Robustness
Girls Boys Natives Immigrants
Hours of homework 0.007*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.009*** (0.001)
Hours of homework2 -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship -0.019*** (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.018*** (0.005) 0.017 (0.013)
Upper secondary -0.011* (0.005) -0.016*** (0.005) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.004 (0.008)
Lower secondary -0.015** (0.006) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.005) 0.006 (0.010)
Incomplete compulsory -0.048*** (0.009) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.048*** (0.008) -0.024** (0.011)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.025*** (0.005) -0.023** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.008)
High blue collar -0.023*** (0.007) -0.047*** (0.006) -0.038*** (0.005) -0.013 (0.009)
Low blue collar -0.044*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010) -0.042*** (0.009) -0.007 (0.013)
Interaction:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002)
Hwk*Upper secondary 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.002)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory 0.002 (0.002) -0.013 (0.015) 0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002)
Hwk*Low white collar 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Hwk*High blue collar 0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Low blue collar 0.003** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) - 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary 0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low white collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother -0.014*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.002) -0.017** (0.008)
Father -0.011*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.006 (0.010)
Mother and father -0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) -0.007 (0.007)
Private teacher -0.064*** (0.004) -0.066*** (0.004) -0.069*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.007)
Others -0.016*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.019*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.005)
Homework help from parents:
A little -0.014*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.004)
Quite some -0.045*** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.002) -0.041*** (0.005)
Much -0.057*** (0.004) -0.063*** (0.004) -0.063*** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.007)
All -0.077*** (0.010) -0.091*** (0.009) -0.091*** (0.008) -0.061*** (0.013)
Started school
between 3 and 5 -0.008*** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.003)
age 6 -0.025*** (0.006) -0.026*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.007) -0.015** (0.006)
age 7 -0.056*** (0.009) -0.042*** (0.008) -0.049*** (0.012) -0.052*** (0.007)
Born in
Latin America -0.026*** (0.003) -0.021*** (0.003) 0.007 (0.008)
Romania 0.004 (0.006) 0.013** (0.006) 0.037*** (0.009)
Morocco -0.021** (0.010) -0.025*** (0.009)
in China 0.020* (0.011) -0.013 (0.015) 0.031** (0.012)
elsewhere -0.006* (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 0.031*** (0.008)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.149*** (0.005) -0.149*** (0.005) -0.147*** (0.006) -0.157*** (0.005)
Disabled -0.206*** (0.008) -0.201*** (0.006) -0.197*** (0.006) -0.218*** (0.010)
Girl -0.008*** (0.001) -0.006* (0.003)
Has repeated grade -0.111*** (0.013) -0.106*** (0.011) -0.125*** (0.011) -0.069*** (0.013)
Age 0.039*** (0.012) 0.027*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.010) 0.017 (0.012)
At home when returning from school:
Father -0.006** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) -0.007* (0.004)
Mother and father -0.004** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.004)
Others 0.001 (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004)
Nobody -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.002) 0.001 (0.005)
Lives with:
Mother only -0.028*** (0.003) -0.035*** (0.003) -0.030*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.006)
Mother and one sibling -0.005 (0.003) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.006** (0.003) -0.016** (0.007)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.018*** (0.005) -0.016*** (0.006) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.021** (0.009)
Mother and father only -0.008*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.004)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.005*** (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005 (0.004)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.012*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.004)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.177*** (0.145) 4.343*** (0.123) 4.228*** (0.123) 4.378*** (0.145)
Observations 22,354 23,496 37,734 8,116
R-squared 0.373 0.377 0.329 0.426
Number of Schools 1,212 1,215 1,222 1,141
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who
started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar and university) and one sibling whose mother is at home when
he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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Table A-8: School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score-Primary School Students:
Robustness continued
Test score Test score No homework help Without repeaters
below 25% above 75% disabled, special
needs students
Hours of homework 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.000)
Hours of homework2 -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship 0.005 (0.007) -0.005** (0.002) -0.043*** (0.013) -0.020*** (0.005)
Upper secondary 0.002 (0.005) -0.001 (0.002) -0.051*** (0.011) -0.020*** (0.004)
Lower secondary 0.004 (0.005) -0.004* (0.002) -0.041*** (0.012) -0.028*** (0.005)
Incomplete compulsory -0.015** (0.007) -0.013** (0.006) -0.068*** (0.018) -0.043*** (0.010)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.002) -0.015 (0.011) -0.026*** (0.004)
High blue collar -0.009* (0.005) -0.001 (0.003) -0.039*** (0.013) -0.040*** (0.005)
Low blue collar -0.015* (0.008) -0.001 (0.006) -0.076*** (0.020) -0.047*** (0.009)
Interaction:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.005** (0.002) 0.002** (0.001)
Hwk*Upper secondary 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.001* (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.005** (0.002) 0.001* (0.001)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.006* (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)
Hwk*Low white collar 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.002) -0.015** (0.006)
Hwk*High blue collar 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001* (0.001)
Hwk*Low blue collar -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.004) 0.004** (0.001)
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory -0.000 (0.000) - 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low white collar -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother 0.001 (0.005) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.002)
Father 0.008 (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.008*** (0.003)
Mother and father 0.000 (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) -0.005** (0.002)
Private teacher -0.007** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.002) -0.081*** (0.003)
Others 0.000 (0.004) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.018*** (0.003)
Homework help from parents:
A little 0.002 (0.003) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.002)
Quite some -0.003 (0.004) -0.008*** (0.001) -0.052*** (0.002)
Much -0.012** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.068*** (0.003)
All -0.027*** (0.007) -0.004 (0.005) -0.069*** (0.009)
Started school
between 3 and 5 0.001 (0.002) -0.001* (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001)
age 6 -0.006 (0.005) -0.008** (0.003) -0.028** (0.012) -0.036*** (0.005)
age 7 -0.026*** (0.006) -0.009 (0.007) -0.059*** (0.017) -0.053*** (0.008)
Born in
Latin America -0.009*** (0.003) -0.003** (0.001) -0.024*** (0.006) -0.032*** (0.003)
Romania 0.009* (0.005) 0.000 (0.002) 0.026*** (0.009) 0.000 (0.005)
Morocco -0.018** (0.007) 0.001 (0.004) -0.010 (0.016) -0.010 (0.010)
China -0.010 (0.011) -0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.020) 0.020** (0.009)
elsewhere 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.001) 0.009 (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.090*** (0.003) -0.017*** (0.004) -0.159*** (0.011)
Disabled -0.128*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.007) -0.229*** (0.016)
Girl 0.004** (0.002) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.015*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.001)
Has repeated grade -0.023** (0.008) -0.004 (0.006) -0.080*** (0.023)
Age 0.004 (0.008) -0.002 (0.005) -0.000 (0.021) 0.064*** (0.012)
At home when returning from school:
Father -0.002 (0.003) -0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.005) -0.005*** (0.002)
Mother and father -0.005* (0.003) -0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.000 (0.001)
Others 0.006** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001)
Nobody 0.005 (0.004) -0.002** (0.001) -0.006 (0.005) -0.004** (0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only -0.015*** (0.003) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.034*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.002)
Mother and one sibling 0.001 (0.004) -0.003** (0.001) -0.013** (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.006 (0.007) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.028** (0.013) -0.018*** (0.004)
Mother and father only -0.012*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.008*** (0.001)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.001) -0.008** (0.004) -0.004*** (0.001)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.010*** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.005) -0.011*** (0.002)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively yes yes no yes
Constant 4.380*** (0.092) 4.780*** (0.060) 4.698*** (0.258) 3.908*** (0.139)
Observations 10,600 12,168 6,289 38,191
R-squared 0.285 0.043 0.364 0.144
Number of Schools 1,172 1,141 1,159 1,220
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who
started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar and university) and one sibling whose mother is at home when
he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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Table A-9: School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score-Secondary School
Students: Robustness
Girls Boys Natives Immigrants
Hours of homework -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Hours of homework2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship -0.025*** (0.007) 0.003 (0.007) -0.011* (0.005) 0.010 (0.011)
Upper secondary -0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 0.009 (0.008)
Lower secondary -0.007 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) 0.000 (0.011)
Incomplete compulsory -0.007 (0.009) -0.004 (0.010) -0.015* (0.009) 0.016 (0.011)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar 0.002 (0.006) -0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.008)
High blue collar 0.003 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) -0.015* (0.009)
Low blue collar 0.006 (0.009) -0.011 (0.009) 0.002 (0.008) -0.009 (0.010)
Interaction:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)
Hwk*Upper secondary -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory -0.000 (0.018) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) -0.004* (0.002)
Hwk*Low white collar 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*High blue collar -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.003* (0.002)
Hwk*Low blue collar -0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002)
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary 0.000 (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
Hwk2*Low white collar -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother -0.004 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.011 (0.009)
Father 0.007 (0.005) 0.000 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.011)
Mother and father 0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.008)
Private teacher 0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.009 (0.006)
Others 0.007** (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.005)
Homework help from parents:
A little -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.004)
Quite some -0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004 (0.005)
Much 0.000 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.009* (0.005) 0.015* (0.009)
All 0.001 (0.015) 0.023* (0.012) 0.001 (0.011) 0.039** (0.017)
Started school
between 3 and 5 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004)
age 6 0.004 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 0.011 (0.007) -0.000 (0.005)
age 7 -0.008 (0.010) -0.006 (0.008) 0.044*** (0.014) -0.008 (0.008)
Born in
Latin America -0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) -0.008 (0.008)
Romania -0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) -0.007 (0.009)
Morocco 0.014 (0.010) -0.004 (0.009)
in China -0.003 (0.012) -0.007 (0.011) -0.010 (0.012)
elsewhere 0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) -0.006 (0.008)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.190*** (0.007) -0.183*** (0.006) -0.187*** (0.005) -0.186*** (0.011)
Disabled -0.143*** (0.003) -0.144*** (0.003) -0.143*** (0.003) -0.147*** (0.005)
Girl -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003)
Has repeated grade 0.004 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) -0.006 (0.006)
Age -0.005* (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004)
At home when returning from school:
Father 0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 0.009** (0.005)
Mother and father -0.004* (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) 0.002 (0.005)
Others 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.004)
Nobody -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004)
Lives with:
Mother only 0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 0.007 (0.005)
Mother and one sibling -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.003) -0.003 (0.007)
Mother and more than one sibling -0.010* (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) -0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.008)
Mother and father only -0.000 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.005)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.004)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.698*** (0.047) 4.535*** (0.043) 4.644*** (0.039) 4.569*** (0.056)
Observations 20,869 21,087 34,498 7,458
R-squared 0.146 0.141 0.142 0.157
Number of Schools 749 744 754 715
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who
started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar and university) and one sibling whose mother is at home when
he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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Table A-10: School-Fixed Eﬀects Regression for Log Test Score-Secondary School
Students: Robustness continued
Test score Test score No homework help Without repeaters
below 25% above 75% disabled, special
needs students
Hours of homework 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
Hours of homework2 -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Educational category parents:
Apprenticeship -0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.009) -0.005 (0.007)
Upper secondary -0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006)
Lower secondary -0.001 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) -0.016** (0.008) -0.002 (0.007)
Incomplete compulsory 0.005 (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) -0.007 (0.012) -0.008 (0.012)
Occupational category parents:
Low white collar -0.001 (0.004) -0.007*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006)
High blue collar 0.002 (0.005) -0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.009) -0.003 (0.008)
Low blue collar -0.000 (0.007) -0.010** (0.004) -0.004 (0.010) -0.004 (0.011)
Interaction:
Hwk*Apprenticeship 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Upper secondary 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Lower secondary 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Hwk*Incomplete compulsory -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)
Hwk*Low white collar -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*High blue collar -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Hwk*Low blue collar -0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
Hwk2*Apprenticeship -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Upper secondary -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Lower secondary -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Incomplete compulsory 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*Low white collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Hwk2*High blue collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000** (0.000)
Hwk2*Low blue collar 0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000** (0.000)
Homework help from:
Mother 0.002 (0.003) -0.004** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003)
Father -0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 0.006 (0.004)
Mother and father 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003)
Private teacher -0.004 (0.002) -0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)
Others -0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)
Homework help from parents:
A little -0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002)
Quite some 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)
Much 0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.003) -0.002 (0.006)
All 0.006 (0.011) 0.004 (0.005) -0.000 (0.015)
Started school
between 3 and 5 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)
age 6 0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006)
age 7 0.009 (0.007) 0.002 (0.005) -0.010 (0.012) 0.015 (0.015)
Born in
Latin America 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
Romania 0.004 (0.005) -0.006* (0.003) -0.002 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008)
Morocco -0.004 (0.009) 0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.011) 0.014 (0.016)
China 0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.006) -0.000 (0.014) -0.007 (0.017)
elsewhere 0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004)
Individual Characteristics:
With special needs -0.064*** (0.004) -0.023** (0.009) -0.183*** (0.009)
Disabled -0.034*** (0.002) -0.027*** (0.005) -0.141*** (0.005)
Girl -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Has repeated grade -0.002 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) 0.005 (0.006)
Age 0.001 (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.000 (0.004) 0.025 (0.022)
At home when returning from school:
Father -0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
Mother and father -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.002)
Others 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Nobody 0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)
Lives with:
Mother only 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)
Mother and one sibling -0.001 (0.003) -0.004* (0.002) 0.002 (0.005) -0.004 (0.004)
Mother and more than one sibling 0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.007) -0.004 (0.006)
Mother and father only 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) -0.000 (0.002)
Mother, father, and more than one sibling -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) -0.000 (0.002)
Diﬀerent living arrangement -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)
Interaction terms: Homework help by mother and/or father
with educational and occupational background respectively yes yes no yes
Constant 4.407*** (0.033) 4.705*** (0.022) 4.622*** (0.056) 4.249*** (0.326)
Observations 10,540 10,427 10,628 25,643
R-squared 0.088 0.010 0.138 0.003
Number of Schools 719 730 749 750
Robust standard errors - clustered at school level - in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Reference group:Boy born in Spain who
started school before the age of 3 who lives with parents (high white collar and university) and one sibling whose mother is at home when
he returns from school and who does not receive any homework help from anybody.
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